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INTRO DUCTION

This season's candidate for shareholders' champion is the " relational investor." 1 If only more investors would take large positions
and then carefully and patiently work with managers to maximize
long-term value, corporations would thrive, takeovers would be unnecessary, and we would grow rich or at least richer. Others have
focused on the possibilities and patterns. 2 In this Article, I focus on
some of the problems.
Relational investing can be divided into three broad types. In the
first type, an investor acquires a large (for example, 9. 5%) interest in
the fi rm and then, through patient and wise counseling and "continuous and textured monitoring," 3 improves the management of the firm ,
profiting along with the other shareholders. I am sure that this sometimes happens, and I will refer to this type of investing as "good" or
''virtuous" relational investing. In this context, one can think of
1 See, e. g. , BernardS. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr. , Hail Britannia?: Ins tit utional Investor
Behavior Under Limited Regulation (John C. Coffee, Jr., R onald J . Gilson & Lewis Lowenstein, eds., forthcoming by Oxford Universit y Press 1994) (copy on file with Columbia I nstitu tional Investor Project); W. Carl Kester & T imothy A . Luehrman , The L BO Association as a
Relationa l In vestm en t R egime: Clinical Eviden ce fro m Clayton, Dubilier & Rice, Inc. (John C.
Coffee, Jr. , Ronald J. Gilson & Lewis Lowenstein, eds., forthcoming by Oxford University
Press 1994); John Po und, Creating R elationships Between Institutional Investors and Co rporations: A Proposal to Restore B alance in the American Corporate Governance Process (joh n C.
Coffee, Jr., Ronald J . Gilson & Lewis Lowenstein, eds., forthcoming by Oxford University
P ress 1994); Michael Useem, Building an Organizationa l Foundation for Relational Investing
(John C. Coffee, Jr. , Ronald J. Gilson & Lewis Lowenstein, eds ., forthcomin g by Oxford University Press i 994); Ronald J. Gilson & R ei nier Kraakman, Investm ent Companies as Guardian Sh areholders: The Place of the MSIC in th e Corporate Governance Debate, 45 STAN. L.
R EV. 985 (1993); Judith H. D obrzynski, R elationsh ip Investing: A New Shareholder is Emerging-Patient and Involved, Bus. W K., Mar. 15, 1993, at 68; Robert Denham, En visioning New
Relationsh ips Between Co rporations and In telligent Investors, Address at th e Conference on
Relat ional Investing, sponsored by the Institutional Investo r Project of the Center for Law and
Econo mic Studies, Colu mbia U niv. School of Law (May 6-7, 1993) [h erein afte r Colum bia
Conference]; Robert A.G. Monks, Relationsh ip Investin g (May 6-7, 1993) (unpublished manu script prepared for the Columbia Con feren ce).
2 See, e.g. , Monks, supra note 1; Pound supra note 1.
3 Jo hn C. Coffee, Jr. , James R. Gillen. Ronald J. Gilson, & Lewis Lowenst ein, Prospectus
5 Columbia Conference, supra note 1.
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Pierre du Pont, when the Du Pont Company owned 23% of an ineptly managed General Motors. Du Pont became president of G M,
replaced its management, reorganized it, and saved the firm-to the
ultimate profit of both the du Pont family and the other shareholders.4 More recently, one thinks of how Warren Buffett, who owns
11% of Salomon, Inc., moved to New York to reorganize and possibly save Salomon after the Treasury auction scandal.
But I am a lawyer: I think about what can go wrong, and what,
if anything, can be done about it. I therefore worry about a second
and third type of relational investing. In the second version, an investor acquires a large (for example, 9.5%) interest in the firm at a discount in exchange for protecting incumbent managers from
displacement or, more generally, from threats to their autonomy. In
this second type, the relational investor profits from providing protection, while the other shareholders lose.
In the third type, the relational investor uses its substantial investment not to protect managers or improve management, but to advance its own business, i.e., by securing favorable contracts with the
firm. The effects of this third kind of relational investing on shareholders and society are more ambiguous.
I will refer to these last two types of relational investing as "bad"
or " corrupt" relational investing. Just as one can identify cases that
look like good relational investing, one can also find cases that look
suspiciously like bad relational investing. The promises and pitfalls of
relational investing derive from these different possibilities. If the
good sort of relational investing can be encouraged, while the bad sort
is limited, shareholders-the principal beneficiaries of traditional corporation law-will benefit. If not, relational investing may do nothing
more than increase agency costs.
Part I describes a number of examples of relational investing that
suggest some of its potential pathologies. Part II abstracts from these
stories, examining the competing incentives for virtue and vice, as
well as some of the specific commitment problems that the corrupt
relational investor must solve in order to make vice possible. Part HI
analyzes the existing and rather toothless legal controls over corrupt
relational investing, examining Delaware corporate law, fede ral securities law, and federal antitrust law. Part IV examines, in a preliminary fashion, alternative approaches to controlling corrupt relational
investing. I focus both on strategies that one might adopt to prevent
the payment of protection money, and, more interestingly, strategies
4

See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR. & STEPHEN SALSBURY , PIERRE S. DU PO NT AN D THE
457-560 (1971) .
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for indirectly undermining corrupt relational investing by undermining the relational investor's ability to make credible commitments.
Yviy preliminary conclusion is that much can go wrong with relational
investing, and little can be done to lessen the risks.

I.

TALES FROM THE DARK SIDE? SOME EXAMPLES OF
RELATIONAL INVESTING

A.

Paying Protection Money

Consider this problematic scenario: In exchange for buying a
large block of specially tailored preferred stock at a low price (what I
will refer to as "sweetheart preferred"), a relational investor agrees to
protect incumbent management from a hostile takeover or other
outside interference with business as usual. In this regard, consider
the following examples.
1.

Corporate Partners and Polaroid

In the spring of 1988, at a time when Polaroid stock was trading
for between $30 and $35 per share, Shamrock Holdings, Inc. ("Shamrock") accumulated slightly less than 5% of Polaroid's stock. In
June, Shamrock contacted Polaroid in an effort to arrange a meeting
to "establish the ground work for a good relationship with the
company." 5
To "protect" Polaroid's shareholders from an anticipated tender
offer from Shamrock, the Board of Directors erected a number of defenses. First, in July 1988, Polaroid established an Employee Stock
Ownership Plan ("ESOP") which purchased 14% of its shares. 6 Second, Polaroid began to plan a share repurchase. 7 Finally, Polaroid
searched for a friendly "white squire" to buy a block of Polaroid
shares. 8
In September 1988, Shamrock commenced a tender offer, offering $42 per share in cash for all outstanding shares of Polaroid's common stock, conditioned upon the tendering of 90% of the shares and
judicial invalidation of the ESOP. 9 Shamrock subsequently increased
its tender offer to $45 per share, and promised to raise the offer to $4 7
s Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ~ 94,340, at 92,217 (Mar. 17, 1989) [hereinafter Polaroid II]. See also Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257 (Del. Ch. 1989) (the Chancery Court opinion approving the ESOP) [hereinafter Polaroid I].
6 Polaroid If, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 92,217.
7 Jd. at 92,217-19.
8

9

Jd.
1d. at 92,217.
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per share if the ESOP shares were declared invalidly issued. 10 Polaroid's board determined that Shamrock's offers were "inadequate," in
part because they did not adequately reflect the value of pending patent infringement litigation with K odak. 11
After Polaroid established its ESOP and while it was planning its
share repurchase, Corporate Partners, an investment fund managed
by Lazard Freres & Co., entered the picture. According to its promotional literature, Corporate Partners was in the business of protecting
management from hostile tender offers:
The fund has been organized to make friendly investments, usually
by taking large minority equity positions of approximately 10% to
30% in publicly held companies which could benefit from the presence of a large, supportive shareholder.

***

The fund will provide two things: (1) an infusion of capital ... and
(2) a block of voting securities in the hands of one sophisticated
entity which will support management and the board of directors.

***

Corporate Partners is also able to provide insulation from market
operators and hostile acquirors .... 12

During the fall of 1988, Polaroid, through its investment banker
Shearson Lehman Brothers Inc., entered into negotiations with Corporate Partners and a number of other potential investors. According
to Shearson, discussions broke down with one investor because it
wanted a 40% interest in Polaroid, and with another because it was
skeptical about Polaroid's business plans. 13 On January 30, 1989, Polaroid sold $300 million of special preferred stock to Corporate Partners and its investment partners. 14
Polaroid issued two special series of preferred stock to Corporate
Partners: $100 million of Series B Cumulative Convertible Preferred
Stock with annual cumulative cash dividends of 11 %; and $200 million of Series C Cumulative Convertible Preferred Stock with annual
cumulative payment-in-kind dividends of 11.5%. 15 In addition, Polaroid issued seven-year warrants for 635,000 shares of common
stock, exercisable at $50 per share (Polaroid's self-tender price). 16
Both series of preferred stock had the right to vote with the com1o Jd. at 92,217-18.
II

Jd.

12 Jd. at 92,216-17 (quoting Corporate Partners' promotional literature).
13

Jd.

14

POLAROID CORP., NOTICE OF 1989 ANNUAL MEETING OF STOCKHOLDERS AND
PROXY STATEMENT (Apr. 28, 1989), available in WESTLAW, SEC-Online file, at * 10.
15
16

ld.
Jd.
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mon stock and, in aggregate, represented just under 10% of the
votes. 17 As part of the purchase, Corporate Partners agreed to a
number of restrictions. Specifically, Corporate Partners agreed not to
(i) deposit any voting securities in a voting trust, (ii) solicit proxies
or become a participant in a proxy solicitation, (iii) form a group
for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting or disposing of voting
securities or (iv) otherwise act, alone or in concert with others, to
seek to affect or influence control of the Company. 18

Moreover, Corporate Partners agreed not to sell its shares to a third
party (though it apparently retained the right to tender into a Shamrock offer). 19
The preferred stock contained both put and call provisions. 20
Polaroid had the option of calling both classes in seven years in cash
at par. 21 Polaroid could call the preferred early in the event of a final
judicial determination or settlement of the Kodak litigation. 22 In the
event that someone other than Shamrock acquired control of Polaroid, Corporate Partners had an option to sell the shares back to Polaroid at a price reflecting an annual rate of return of 28-30%. Finally,
Corporate Partners had the right to name two directors. 23
In March 1989, after Polaroid had placed 14% of its shares in an
ESOP, 10% of its shares with Corporate Partners, and had launched
an $800 million self-tender (16 million shares at $50 per share), Shamrock abandoned its takeover bid and negotiated a peace treaty. 24
Shamrock and Polaroid agreed that Shamrock would withdraw its
tender offer and proposed proxy contest, agree to a ten-year standstill,
and withdraw all pending litigation, in return for Polaroid's promise
to distribute to shareholders a portion of its proceeds from the Kodak
litigation and a payment of $25 million ($20 million as reimbursement
of expenses and $5 million as a nonrefundable advance payment for
radio and television advertising time on Shamrock's affiliated radio
and/or television stations)? 5 After the agreement was announced,
17

Jd. at "'3.
ld. at *10.
19 Jd.
2 0 A "put" permits its holder to sell a certain stock or commodity at a fixed price for a
stated quantity and within a stated period. A "call" is the reverse-permitting its holder to
purchase. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1237 (6th ed. 1990).
21 Polaroid 11, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 94,340, at 92,219 (Mar.
17, 1989).
22 !d.
23 POLAROID CORP., supra note 14, at * 10.
24 Jd.at*11.
18

25

Jd.

1994]

CONTROLLING THE DARK SIDE

993

Polaroid stock dropped $4.50, to $36 per share. 26
On October 7, 1991, just over two and one-half years after Corporate Partners purchased preferred stock for $300 million, Polaroid
bought it all back for $420 million ($280 million in cash and $140
million in convertible subordinated debentures). 27 Adding to this the
nearly $30 million in dividends that were due quarterly in cash on the
Series B preferred stock, Corporate Partners' profit on its $300 mil ~
lion investment approached $150 million, an annual return of nearly
20%. The new issue of subordinated debentures is convertible into
common stock at a price of $32 per share, giving Corporate Partners
potential control over 8.1% of Polaroid's shares. 28 Immediately prior
to the September 1991 announcement that Polaroid would buy back
the preferred stock, Polaroid traded at $24.875 per share. 29
2.

Some Other Examples?

Corporate Partners' investment in Polaroid is not an isolated example of sweetheart preferred. In the 1980s, Warren Buffett was Corporate Partners' chief competitor as management's savior. In 1987,
Salomon faced a bid for control from Ronald Perelman. 30 Salomon
was vulnerable because its stock had dropped and, more troubling,
Minorco had publicly disclosed that it wanted to sell its 14% block of
common stock. 31 To "protect" itself, Salomon bought back the Minorco block at a premium above market value, and then turned
around and sold Buffett a new issue of special preferred stock carrying
12% of the votes for $700 million. 32 A rather skeptical commentator
estimated that on the open market, the preferred, which receives a
dividend of 9% per year plus the same opportunity for gains as the
26 Robert J. Cole, Polaroid Payout Plan Helps in Reaching Shamrock Accord, N.Y. TIM ES,
Mar. 28, 1989, at D 1.
27 POLAROID CORP., PROXY STATEMENT (Mar. 30, 1992), available in WESTLAW, SECOnline file, at *4.
28 ld. at "4-5.
29 Barnaby J. Feder, Polaroid to Buy Back Fund's Large Holding, N.Y. TIM ES , Sept. 13 ,
1991, at D3. Corporate Partners has continued in the business of relati onal investing. In Jun e
1990, it bought (at a discount) a 13 % stake of newly issued common stock of First Bank
System, a Minneapolis bank, and entered into an agreement not to engage in a proxy fight or
sell more than a 5% stake to another investor. See Stephen E . Clark, A Big Equity Stake, Well
Done, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR , Sept. 1991 , at 178 . Corporate Partners' subsequent in vestments (in Transco, Albert Fisher, Continental Cablevision, and First Bank Systems) ha ve departed from the Polaroid model. While often involving special issues of preferred stock with
restrictions, they did not arise in the context of a contest for control.
30 Michael Lewis, The Temptation of St. Warren, THE NEW REP UB LIC, Feb . 17, 1992, a t
22.
3 1 James Stemgold, Salomon to Sell 12 % to Buffett, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 198 7, at D 1.
32 SALOMON, INC., 1987 ANNUAL R EPORT (1988), available in WESTLAW , SEC-Onlin e
file , at *34; Sterngold, supra note 31.
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common shareholders, would have sold for between $850 million and
$1.2 billion. 33
In 1989, Buffett made similar "off market" investments. In July,
Gillette, faced with takeover attempts by Ronald Perelman and
Coniston Partners, sold Warren Buffett $600 million worth of a special convertible preferred stock issue carrying 11% of the votes, a dividend of 8.75%, and most of the upside potential of common stock. 34
In August, USAir, another firm in play, sold Buffett $358 million
worth of newly issued convertible preferred stock that carried with it
a 9.25% dividend and the right to vote 11%. 35 In December, Champion International, in the wake of hostile tender offers in the paper
industry, sold Buffett $300 million of a new special issue of preferred
stock with a 9.25o/o dividend and 8% of the votes. 36 Unlike standard
convertible preferred stock, these issues were mostly nonsalable. 37
They differed in another respect from standard convertible preferred
as well: they all voted on a fully converted basis. 3 8 These negotiated
purchases of preferred stock stand in stark contrast to Buffett's traditional practice of establishing relationships by assembling large blocks
in open-market transactions. 39
33 Lewis, supra note 30, at 22. L o uis Lowenstein countered that the price Buffett paid
represented the full val ue of the Salomon shares absent the takeover premium that disappeared
with Perelman (Comment by Lewis Lowenstein on a draft of this Article).
34 GILLETTE Co ., 1989 ANNUAL REPORT (1990), available in WESTLAW, SEC-Online
file, at * 17-18; Alison L. Cowan, Gillette Sells 11 % Stake to Bu./feu , N.Y. TIM ES, July 21,
1989, a t D l.
3S BERKSH IRE HATH AWAY I NC., 1989 ANNUAL REPORT (1990), available in WESTLAW,
SEC-On li ne file, at *33; Kurt Eichenwa ld, Buffett's Stake in USAir Seen as Takeover Move,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug . 8, 1989, at D2.
:lb BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, supra note 35; Jonathan P. Hicks, Champion Sells Berkshire
300.000 Shares, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1989, at D4.
3 7 BERKSH IRE HATHAWAY, supra note 35, at *1 8; USAIR, 1989 ANNUA L REPORT, available in W ESTLAW, SEC-Online file, at * 108-09.
38 BERKSH IRE HATHAWAY, supra note 35, at * 18. As Buffett put it , the managers of these
companies
have demonstrated some confidence in us, insisting in each case that o ur preferreds
have unrestricted voting rights o n a full y-converted basis, an a rrange ment th a t is
far from standard in corporate finance. In effect they a re trustin g us to be intelligent owners, thinking about tomorrow instead of today, just as we are trusting
th em to be intelligen t managers, thinking about tomorrow as well as today.
I d.
:n See, e.g., General Food Shares Bought , N.Y . TIMES, Feb. 20, 1981 , at D4 (Buffett discioses acq uisition of 5.2 % inte rest in General Foods); R obert J. Cole, Coke Says Buffetr Has
6.3% Siake, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1989 , at Dl (Buffett acquired stake over eight or nine
month s); Buffett Acquires 5.8% Rorer Stake, N.Y. TIM ES, Apr. 7, 1990, at 35 (Buffett disclosed that he has amassed a 5.8% stake); Buffett Acquires 9.8% of Wells Fargo Shares , N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 25, 1990, a t D4 (Buffett disclosed that he purchased control of 9.8% of th e company); Buffett Lifts Take in Wells Fargo to 10.75 %, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1992, a t D6 (Buffett
increased stake by buyi ng shares worth abo ut $41. 5 million) ; Bu./feu 's Firm In creases Stake in
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A few other examples: In 1989, General Electric Capital Corporation bought $28 million of a special issue of 10% preferred shares
from Dunkin' Donuts Inc. in the face of a tender offer. 40 Diamond
Shamrock defeated a hostile partial tender offer by T. Boone Pickens
in early 1987 by selling a $300 million issue of special preferred shares
to Prudential. 41 Prudential played the same role for Phillips-Van
Heusen.42 The intuition that relational investors who purchase special issue preferred stock profit at the expense of the common stockholders is consistent with recent empirical work. 43

B.

Keeping the Relations Happy

Another problematic scenario: The relational investor acquires a
large block of stock in the firm, perhaps on the open market, and
designates a number of directors. Everyone now understands that the
relational investor has the power to replace incumbent managers if it
becomes unhappy with their performance. Shortly thereafter, the relational investor becomes one of the firm's largest suppliers, outpacing
all competitors in securing the firm's business.
1.

Du Pont and General Motors

The Du Pont Company's 44 investment in General Motors
("GM") provides, for some, an attractive model for corporate governance-a potential alternative to the Berle & Means corporation. 45
Wells Fargo, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1992, at D3 (Buffett increased stake to 11. 8% by buying
another 547,000 shares); Adam Bryant, Berkshire Holds 14.9% of General Dynamics , N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 1992, at D3 ("The exact price that Mr. Buffett paid ... is unclear, al though he
was probably buying them in recent weeks under the cover of the hea vy trad ing that has
followed General Dynamics' announcement of a stock repurchase program . .. . ").
4 0 Laura Jereski, Enter the Core Investor-to Cheers and Boos, Bus. WK. , Sept. 18, 1989, at
104.
41 Edward D. Herlihy & David A. Katz, Mergers and Acquisitions: Recent Developments in
Takeover Tactics and Defense, in 23RD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION
(PLI Corp. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series, 1991 ), available in WESTLAW, TPALL file, 754 PLI/Corp 453. See also MAXUS ENERGY CoRP., Dec. 31, 1987 !OK (1987),
available in WESTLAW, SEC-Online file, at *2 (describing the Prudential preferred) .
4 2 PHILLIPS-VAN HEUSEN CORP., 1987 ANNUAL REPORT (1988), available in
WESTLAW, SEC-Online file, at *7 (The company repurchased the preferred in 1992.); PHILLIPS-VAN HEUSEN CORP. , PROXY STATEMENT (Apr. 27, 1992), available in WESTLAW.
SEC-Online file, at *3.
43 See Lilli A. Gordon & John Pound, Active Investing in the U.S. Equity Market: Past
Performance and Future Prospects (1993) (a review of the empirical literature and a study of
the effects on common stockholders of negotiated and non-negotiated share purchases prepared for The California Public Employees' Retirement System) (unpublish ed manuscript,
Gordon Group, Inc., Newton, Mass.).
44 In keeping with Chandler and Salsbury's practice, I will use "Du Pont" to refer to the
company and "du Pont" to refer to the family and its m embers.
45 See LOUIS N. LOWENSTEIN, SENSE & NONSE NSE IN COR PORATE FINAN CE 21 1-17
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The story is well known, but worth summarizing. 46 In 1917, DuPont
acquired about 23% of GM stock at a time when GM was a distant
second in the automobile industry. At the same time, Pierre du Pont,
then Chairman of the Board of Du Pont, also became Chairman of
the Board of GM. By the end of 1920, after a badly managed postwar
expansion and a significant recession, GM was on the brink of bankruptcy. At that time, Pierre duPont, who had withdrawn from active
management of DuPont in 1919, became President of GM. During
the next two and one-half years, he devoted himself full-time to reorganizing and restructuring GM, turning over the presidency to Alfred
P . Sloan, Jr., in May 1923. By 1928, GM had replaced Ford as the
leading American automobile company.
From one perspective, this seems to be the paradigm of good relational investing. A large shareholder, by virtue of its holdings in the
firm, actively monitors managers and, when necessary, steps in to
replace bad managers and to reorganize the firm. Pierre du Pont's
scrutiny of GM was an example of "continuous and textured
monitoring. " 47
But even in this paradigm case, there is more to the story. Du
Pont's holdings of GM gave rise to a major antitrust case, leading to
forced divestiture. The courts' opinions describe a different, and potentially more troubling, aspect of the relationship. 48
Pierre duPont and his long time business associate and the treasurer of DuPont, John Raskob, first invested in GM in 1914, becoming directors in 1915. In 1917, when Raskob recommended that Du
Pont acquire a significant interest in G M, his memo identified two
principal reasons. Not only would the investment be profitable, but
also "our interest in the General Motors Company will undoubtedly
secure for us the entire Fabrikoid [an artificial leather], Pyralin, paint
and varnish business of those companies, which is a substantial
factor. " 49
Beginning with the 1917 purchase of GM stock, Du Pont set
about increasing its sales to GM. 5° From the beginning, the DuPont
(1991); Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
10, 15 (1991).
46 For a full account, see CHANDLER & SALSBURY, supra note 4, at 433-591.
47 See, e.g., LOWENSTEIN, supra note 45.
4 8 United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 366 U .S. 316 (1961) (ordering divestiture); United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U. S. 586 (1957) (reversing the trial
court and holding that Du Pont's investment in GM violated section 7 of the Clayton Act)
[hereinafter DuPont (GM) ]; United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp.
235 (N.D. Ill. 1954).
4 9 United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp. at 241.
so Jd. at 269.
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people at GM kept tabs on the amount of GM business going to Du
Pont and the amounts placed with Du Pont's competitors. The most
prominent example was J. A. Haskell, the former sales manager and
vice president of DuPont, who became GM's vice president in charge
of the Operations Committee, a director, and a member of GM's Executive Committee. Haskell openly set about gaining the maximum
share of GM's sales for Du Pont, setting up lines of communication
within GM to keep him, and, through him, Du Pont, informed of
G M' s purchases. 51 As part of this effort, Haskell wrote letters to G M
divisions directly inquiring into the extent to which they were
purchasing their requirements from Du Pont. 52
By 1920, Pierre du Pont, then President and Chairman of the
Board of GM, was able to report to his brother, Lammot du Pont,
Vice President of Du Pont, that Du Pont had secured the lion's share
of OM's business from four of GM's divisions. Du Pont predicted
"'that with the change in management at Cadillac, Oakland, and
Oldsmobile,' he thought Du Pont should be able to sell substantially
all the paint, varnish and fabrikoid products needed, further, he
thought a 'drive for the Fisher Body business' should be made." 5 3
The contrast between GM's purchasing and Fisher Body's
purchasing is striking. While G M owned 60% of the stock of Fisher
Body, a voting trust gave the Fisher brothers broad powers of management; they insisted on running their own show. For years, they
withstood pressure from high-ranking DuPont and GM executives to
switch to Du Pont. Even after GM acquired 100% of Fisher in 1926,
they still had sufficient power to resist. By the late 1940s, however,
even Fisher Body had fallen into line.
The government presented no evidence of any formal agreement
between GM and DuPont whereby GM would buy from DuPont.
Indeed, the trial court recounted instances when GM purchased from
Du Pont's competitors. Yet, the evidence is clear that high-ranking
executives of General Motors who were part of the Du Pont group,
like Haskell, made constant inquiries and reviews of GM's purchases.
This sort of open scrutiny by representatives of the dominant shareholder likely made a substantial impact on purchasing managers. As
the Supreme Court noted, " [i]t would be understandably difficult for
them not to interpret it as meaning that a preference was to be given
to Du Pont products. " 54 For the Supreme Court,
51

52
53

54

ld.
ld.
l d. at 270.
Du Pont (GM), 353 U.S. 586, ()03 (1957).
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[t]he fact that sticks out in this voluminous record is that the bulk
of Du Pont's production has always supplied the largest part of the
requirements of the one customer in the automobile industry connected to Du Pont by a stock interest. The inference is overwhelming that Du Pont's commanding position was promoted by its
stock interest and was not gained solely on competitive merit. 55

The Du Pont (GM) case provides an illustration of how relational
investing could be used to enrich the relational investor through preferential contracts, rather than to enrich the shareholders as a whole
through improved management. But the evidence from that case suggests that whatever drove the relationship in its early years, it is unlikely that fabric and finish contracts drove it by the time of the
antitrust action. When the government's case was filed in 1947, Du
Pont's interest as the owner of 62 million shares was worth approximately $2 billion, while it supplied only about $22 million per year in
fabrics and finishes .56
Moreover, a private suit was filed by minority shareholders of
GM in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision, alleging that Du
Pont violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, section 7 of the
Clayton Act, and its fiduciary duties to GM, by using its stock interest to displace competition in fabrics and finishes between 1950 and
1959.57 After a bench trial, the trial court rejected plaintiffs' claims,
holding that Du Pont "did not, by reason of its stock ownership, control the purchases by General Motors of finishes [and fabrics] from du
Pont, and it did not insulate General Motors from competition in this
line of commerce during the years 1950-1959." 58 Indeed, applying
Delaware law, the trial court held that DuPont's sales to GM met the
entire fairness standard: the sales and purchases resulted from competitive conditions, they were at competitive prices, and of competitive quality. 59
2.

A More Recent Example?

In early 1989, Transco Energy Company, an oil and gas concern,
sold Corporate Partners $125 million of a special issue of9.25% convertible preferred stock entitled to vote with common stock, repreJd. at 605-06.
Jd. at 629.
5 7 Gottesman v. G eneral Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 436 F.2d
1205 (2d Cir. 1971).
5 8 Jd. at 380-81.
5 9 !d. at 385.
55
56
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senting 9% of the votes, 60 in connection with Transco's acquisition of
Texas Gas Transmission Corp. (a natural gas pipeline system being
auctioned by CSX Corp.). 61
Over the subsequent months, Transco and related entities paid
Lazard Freres the following fees: in May 1989, $937,500 plus expenses for financial advisory services in connection with the private
placement of the 9.25% preferred as well as $3,500,000 for investment
banking services in connection with the acquisition of Texas Gas; in
August 1989, $707,441 plus expenses for financial services in connection with the sale of certain onshore oil and gas properties; and in
September 1989, $8,048,455 plus expenses in connection with the sale
of certain other assets, and another $500,000 in connection with other
asset sales. 62
Subsequently, in 1990, Transco engaged Lazard as its agent in
the sale of a natural gas field in Louisiana for a fee of .66% of the
ultimate sales price. 63 In June 1992, that property was sold for $82
million, 64 resulting in an additional fee of $541,200 for Lazard. Thus,
from 1989 through 1992, Lazard received $14,234,596 in investment
banking fees (plus expenses) from its involvement with Transco.
One does not know whether Corporate Partners' investment in
Transco led to the Lazard assignment, whether Lazard's long-time
representation of Transco led to the Corporate Partners investment,
or whether the events were entirely unrelated. Corporate Partners
maintains that they were unrelated. 65 But the Transco/Lazard/Corporate Partners relationship effectively illustrates the potential for using investment banking fees to keep a relational investor happy.
Perhaps it is a recognition of this difficulty that has led Ali Wambold
(co-Managing Director of Corporate Partners and a partner in Lazard) to maintain that "the Corporate Partners fund is completely
separate from Lazard's investment banking business ... to prevent
potential conflicts of interest. " 66
60 TRANSCO ENERGY Co., PROXY STATEMENT (Mar. 30, 1990), available in WESTLAW,
SEC-Online file, at *24.
61 W. David Gibson, Selling a Friendly Stake, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Mar. 1990, at
93.
6 2 TRANSCO ENERGY Co., supra note 60, at *23-24.
63 !d. at *30.
6 4 TRANSCO ENERGY Co., Sept. 30, 1992 10Q ( 1992), available in WESTLAW, SEC-Onli ne file , at *16-17.
65 Personal communication with Lester Pollack, Sr. Managing Director, and Jonathan Kagan, Managing Director of Corporate Partners, June 23, 1993 .
6 6 Rosalyn Retkwa, Wfdte Squire Can Help You Make it Through the Knight , CoRP.
CASHFLOW, Mar. 1990, at 10.
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THE LOGIC OF RELATIONAL INVESTING

These examples suggest the possibility that sometimes relational
investing may be corrupt rather than virtuous. Before turning to existing and potential legal responses to bad relational investing, one
needs to focus on the structure of the relationship between relational
investors and managers. The following subsection focuses on the incentives in the formation of the relationship. The next subsection focuses on the incentives once the relationship has been established.
A.

The Basic Incentives I: Establishing the Relationship

Consider the following stylized fact pattern. Let us assume that
Relational Investor ("RI"), an investment fund specializing in relational investing, is considering acquiring a 9.5% interest in Managerial Inc. ("MI"), a heretofore management dominated corporation.
Consider the prospect from the various perspectives: the perspective
of MI's managers; Rl's perspective; and the perspective of the other
shareholders of MI.
1.

Management's Perspective

How managers might greet the prospect of RI's arrival will depend on a number of factors. If their control over MI is secure, one
might expect managers to be rather hostile to the idea of RI acquiring
a block sufficiently large to jeopardize their independence. Indeed, if
RI is likely to threaten managers, either by criticizing managers' decisions, blocking managers' plans, limiting managers' compensation or
expenditures on perquisites, or seeking to displace managers, managers are likely to offer vigorous resistance to RI's arrival. 67
67

Past experience teaches that unhappy relational investors can make life miserable for
managers. Recall the difficult relationship between Chris-Craft Industries and Warner Communications in the years after Chris-Craft acquired a 19% interest in Warner in helping Steven
Ross resist a 1983 takeover attempt by Rupert Murdoch . See, e.g., Wolfgang Saxon, Deal
Ends Murdoch's Fight to Take Over Warner, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1984, at 33; Alex S. Jones,
Chris-Craft Gets 19% of Warner, N.Y . TIMES, Jan. 19, 1984, at Dl.
For some legal episodes from their bad marriage, see, for example, Warner Communications, Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., 583 A.2d 962 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 567 A.2d 419 (Del.
1989); Warner Communications, Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus. Inc., No. CIV.A.l0817, 1989 WL
85085 (Del. Ch. July 24, 1989); Warner Communications, Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus . Inc. , No.
CIV.A.10817, 1989 WL 51662 (Del. Ch. May 15 , 1989).
See also Robert J. Cole, Chris-Craft and Warner, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1985, at D6
(Steven Ross and Herbert Siegel are "working on 'a complete divorce'"); Robert J. Cole, Concession to Chris-Craft on Warner, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1989 , at 35 (Time and Warner "willing
to concede that Warner had violated a contract with Chris-Craft" and "asked the Delaware
Chancery Court to order Chris-Craft to decide what it wants in return"); Geraldine Fabrikant,
Chris-Craft Gains Seats, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1986, at 34 (Chris-Craft ends up with 6 of 16
seats on Warner's board); Warner Blocked by Judge in $1.2 Billion Lorimar Bid, N.Y. TIMES,
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But if sharks are circling, that is, if there is some reason to believe that the firm is in play or that a group of shareholders has organized sufficiently to threaten managers' autonomy, the arrival of RI
may be more welcome. If RI offers to protect managers from being
displaced in a hostile tender offer or from other threats to their autonomy, managers may not only welcome Rl, but may be willing to pay a
significant amount of the corporation's money to encourage R I to
come aboard.
The extent to which a relational investor can offer protection depends on the nature of the threat. Managers of RI can face threats
from at least three directions: hostile tender offers; proxy fights; and
organized shareholders exerting their influence through internal corporate channels, including the board of directors, shareholder proposals, corporate elections, and other informal means. Because of the
way that Delaware law has developed, relational investors have recently been able to offer the greatest protection from hostile tender
offers, but much less protection from other threats.
In this connection, section 203 of the Delaware Corporate Law
provides a crucial piece of the puzzle. 68 Enacted in 1987 in the wake
of the United States Supreme Court's decision in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America 69 ("CTS"), section 203 prohibits a hostile
bidder from engaging in any "business combinations" with the target
for three years unless it acquires 85% of the shares in the transaction
that takes it over the 15% threshold. 70 Such a delay seriously interferes with tender offer financing, as well as with paying down acquisition debt by selling assets of the target, and therefore provides a
substantial impediment to hostile tender offers. The effect of section
203 is that, as a practical matter, a friendly nonmanagement shareholder holding 10% or so can go a long way towards blocking any
hostile tender offer.
But if the threat to managers comes from elsewhere, a 10%
shareholder cannot provide managers with as much protection. If, for
example, a bidder combines a tender offer with a proxy fight , holding
Sept. 29, 1988, at D22 (Warner's acquisition of Lorimar blocked because it violated Warner's
agreement with Chris-Craft); Warner's Ross Gets Contract, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1987, at DS
(9-6 vote on new contract for Ross, with the six Chris-Craft directors voting against).
Recall, also, GM management's experience with Ross Perot. See, e.g. , Grobow v. Perot,
539 A.2d 180 (Del. 1988). After Perot became the largest shareholder of GM, he became
increasingly critical of GM's management; GM ultimately repurchased his shares. Jd.
68 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (1992) .
69 481 u.s. 69 (1987).
70 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203; see I ERNEST L. FOLK, III, RODMAN WARD , JR . &
EDWARD P . WELCH, FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW§ 203: 8 (3d
ed. 1992).
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out the promise to shareholders of a substantial premium if they replace incumbent directors with a new slate committed to permitting a
bid to go forward, a relational investor will no longer have a blocking
position. In this situation, the 85% requirement of section 203 will be
avoided if the shareholders elect a new set of directors who approve
the "business combination" or the tender offer before the bidder becomes an "interested shareholder," i.e., before the bidder crosses the
15% threshold.
Similarly, a relational investor cannot protect managers from the
threat posed by organized and dissatisfied shareholders. To the extent
that shareholders exert their influence internally, putting a 10% block
of shares in the hands of a friendly relational investor will provide
only limited protection.
This simplified analysis suggests that managers will be most
likely to seek out friendly relational investors when (a) they are
threatened, (b) that threat comes from a hostile tender offer, (c) a
friendly relational investor can block a hostile tender offer, and (d)
better alternatives are not readily available. Indeed, one is struck by
the relatively large number of relationships established in the period
between the enactment of Delaware section 203 in 1987 and the decline of the hostile tender offer at the end of the decade.
2.

The Relational Investor's Perspective

Now, consider the prospect of investing in MI from the relational
investor's perspective. Whether or not it is an attractive investment
prospect will depend on the costs, benefits, and risks. In the good
scenario, where RI determines to acquire its interest by buying 9.5%
in the market, and thereafter uses its stock position to improve management of the firm, RI's returns will depend solely on how much the
returns on the stock will improve by virtue of the improved management, and how likely it is that R I will succeed in improving the management or bringing in new management. Central toRI's calculation
,,vill be the fact that RI, as a shareholder, will get only its pro rata
share (9.5%) of any improvement in the firm's fortunes, while it will
bear 100% of its costs of monitoring and disciplining.
But, if managers are willing to pay protection money, that is, to
pay R I directly or indirectly to protect them from interference, the
calculation fundamentally changes. In addition to whatever increase
in value might arise from improved management, RI now can expect
100% of any direct or indirect payments. Similarly, if RI can expect
to increase significantly its sales or profit margins to MI by virtue of
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its stock interest, those additional profits must be added to the potential returns on the investment in calculating overall returns.
Here, we come to the crux of the problems posed by relational
investing. From an economic perspective, RI will be indifferent between gains from improved management, gains from direct or indirect
payoffs, and gains from increased sales or profit margins. Whichever
has the tighest net present value will be the most attractive. But there
are three factors that make it substantially more likely that profiting
from protection payments, when offered, or expanded sales or increased margins will dominate good relational investing. First, R I
will only receive a pro rata share of the gains from improved management while it will receive all of the protection money and all of the
profits from increased sales or increased profit margins. Second, improving management can be costly and RI will bear all of its costs.
Third, the gains toRI from improved management are far more speculative than gains from either a protection payment, expanded sales,
or increased margins. There is precious little evidence that relational
investing significantly improves performance, much less that the magnitude of the gains makes relational investing economically attractive.71 However savvy a relational investor, it is hard to imagine
relational investing earning the 20% annual return that Corporate
Partners received on its "investment" in Polaroid. 72
3.

The Shareholders' Perspective

But, while relational investors will be indifferent to the sources of
their gains, other shareholders will not be. In the first scenario, where
RI's efforts improve the quality of management, gains from improved
management benefit shareholders pro rata, while RI bears the cost.
As such, from the shareholders' perspective, good relational investing
is an undiluted pleasure, a free ride.
In the second scenario, when managers seeking insulation from
threats to their control make direct or indirect payments to RI for
protection, the other shareholders lose. Such payments add directly
71 For an optimistic recent survey of the empirical evid ence that still finds only modest
support for the view that monitoring by large shareholders improves corporate performance,
see BernardS. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: Th e Empirical Eviden ce,
39 UCLA L. REV. 895, 917-27 (1992). See also Gordon & Pound , supra note 43.
72 This fundamental conflict of interest between relationa l investors and other shareholders
makes one wonder what drives the relational investing observed abroad , namely, Japanese
keiretsu and German universal bank dominated governance structures. Specifically, one wonders how relational investors in those systems benefit: Does their profit come in the form of
higher stock prices, or higher dividends from better management , or in a stream of fees fo r
banking or other services? See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: Th e In stitutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. R E V. 1277, 1294-1306 (1991).

